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ABSTRACT
Over the course of five days in August 2011, destructive riots spread throughout England. 
This paper examines the political consequences of these riots. It investigates how the ri-
ots opened up a space for political debate and action, exploring how actors in journalism, 
research, and policymaking interacted to construct the meaning of the public disruption 
and direct the government’s response. It finds that a dominant frame emerged early in the 
debate, constructing the rioters and the community in opposition and establishing the riots 
as apolitical. In this context, politicians were able to define the riots in terms of two crises: a 
crisis of public order and a crisis of social breakdown. These early framing activities shaped 
subsequent research on the causes of the riots and enabled politicians to use the events to ad-
vance policy issues of interest to them. This paper suggests that governments do not respond 
mechanistically to public disruptions. Instead, governments participate actively in a mean-
ing making process and the outcome of this process helps steer the course of political action.
On August 4, 2011, Mark Duggan, a twenty-nine-year-old black father of four, was shot and killed by police in Tottenham, north 
London. Duggan died near the Broadwater Farm 
Estate, the public housing development that was his 
childhood home. In 1985, when Duggan was a child, 
Broadwater Farm had gained notoriety as the site of 
riots fueled by resident antagonisms toward the po-
lice. After his death, Broadwater Farm served as a 
gathering spot for Duggan’s neighbors and loved ones, 
who marched to the local police station demanding 
answers. The crowd outside the Tottenham police 
station waited for a satisfactory response for several 
hours before violence broke out, triggering a chain of 
events that led to images of England burning being 
transmitted around the globe.  
Between August 6 and 10, 2011, England expe-
rienced its worst rioting in recent history. Violence 
outside the Tottenham police station grew into wide-
spread unrest in London and across England in cities 
like Birmingham, Manchester, Nottingham, and Liv-
erpool. The scale of violence and destruction was mas-
sive; the total cost of the riots was officially estimated 
to exceed 500 million pounds.1 Five people lost their 
lives, hundreds were injured, and numerous homes 
and businesses were destroyed. More than 3,000 peo-
ple have been charged in connection to the riots, with 
over 2,000 found guilty.2  
The riots necessitated a political response, but 
what form that response should take was not immedi-
ately obvious. To sell and pursue a convincing course 
of action, political actors needed to identify the na-
ture of the event and offer a compelling diagnosis of 
its causes. Yet riots are ambiguous and defy easy ex-
planation. Rioters do not hold up signs detailing their 
motives, nor do they risk arrest to speak up after the 
event. Spontaneous and lacking formal organization, 
riots are typically not represented by organizations 
that continue to exist after they end. 
Because of this ambiguity, riots serve as strong 
cases to study how political actors behave when a 
space for contention opens, and how they can lever-
age events to secure desired objectives. The dynamics 
of early political discourse can constrain later debates 
and influence what policy issues become more salient 
after a major shock to the political system. Riots of-
fer a chance to study how some voices are enabled to 
steer political conversation, while others are preclud-
ed from participating.  
The 2011 English riots offer an especially favor-
able opportunity to pursue these goals because they 
were particularly tricky for political actors to inter-
simone zhang, harvard university (2012)
to construct a riot:
interpretations and consequences of the 2011 english riots 
THE PETER AND KATHERINE TOMASSI ESSAY
7
to construct a riot: interpretations and consequences of the 2011 english riots
pret. Literature on the political consequences of riots 
has been largely based on U.S. urban riots in the 1960s 
and 1970s. While not planned or guided by civil rights 
groups during the Civil Rights Movement, those riots 
were used rhetorically by those groups and considered 
a form of protest within the African-American com-
munity.3 The 2011 English riots, by contrast, did not 
appear connected to any larger social movement. They 
took place in poor and middle class neighborhoods 
alike, and drew participants of all races.4 The rioters 
did not constitute a defined group and no movement 
appropriated the riots after the fact.5 Consequently, 
there was no clear authority figure available to explain 
the events. The riots thus opened a wide space for de-
bate, allowing people uninvolved with the action to 
construct their meaning and direct their impact. 
Without an easily evident course of action, how 
do governments respond to instances of public unrest? 
Scholarship in the social sciences has been focused on 
identifying the causes of riots, but relatively little work 
has studied their political consequences.6 This paper 
builds on existing theories that posit causal relation-
ships between riots and political outcomes. It begins 
to unpack the mechanisms behind these relationships 
by examining how the process of interpreting the riots 
mediated between the event and its consequences. To 
do this, it investigates the roles of politicians, the news 
media, and researchers in shaping the discourse on 
the riots, filling a gap in research on the 2011 English 
riots.7 This paper focuses on the five months between 
August and December 2011. The concepts of frames 
and framing processes guide the analysis of primary 
documents and interviews with actors in politics, pol-
icymaking, journalism, and research. 
 
POLITICAL CONTEXT
In 2011, the United Kingdom was governed 
by a coalition between the Conservative Party, un-
der Prime Minister David Cameron, and the Liberal 
Democrats, under Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. 
The Labour Party formed the Official Opposition. 
Prior to the 2010 election, the Conservative Party had 
suffered three successive general election defeats to 
Labour. These losses led the Conservatives to realize 
they needed to move past Margaret Thatcher’s legacy 
on conservatism.8 Seeking to shed their image as “the 
nasty party,” 9 the Conservatives moved toward a new 
“compassionate conservatism,” combining a commit-
ment to a strong economy with an interest in social inclusion. 
Two aspects of Cameron’s vision for social policy 
reflect this shift. One aspect was the Broken Britain 
thesis, which claimed that British society was decay-
ing, harming citizens and endangering young people. 
This view marked a step away from the individual-
istic explanations for bad behavior and the punitive 
stance traditionally associated with the Conservatives. 
It drew from the work of the Centre for Social Justice, 
a think tank that presented a narrative of a broken so-
ciety involving multiple pathways to poverty: family 
breakdown, educational failure, worklessness and eco-
nomic dependence, addictions, and indebtedness. 10 
A second central concept that undergirded Cameron’s 
social policy was the “Big Society,” the flagship policy 
idea of the 2010 Conservative Party Election Mani-
festo.11 Big Society set out a vision for a smaller state 
supported by greater civil society engagement. Under 
Big Society, government would give power back to 
communities to make decisions and achieve shared 
goals. By promoting volunteerism and entrepreneur-
ship, Big Society would help reinstate a culture of re-
sponsibility.
PERSPECTIVES LINKING RIOTS 
TO POLITICAL OUTCOMES 
 Literature connecting riots and political out-
comes can be sorted into two main perspectives. The 
first perspective conceives of riots as a form of protest, 
with most work motivated by an interest in assess-
ing how effective riots are for achieving the political 
aims of rioters. Scholars have typically assigned state 
responses to riots into one of two categories: concilia-
tory actions to appease rioters and repressive actions 
to quell unrest through coercion.12 Imputing political 
goals to rioters, these scholars consider conciliatory 
action a success and repressive action a failure. The 
second perspective connecting riots to political con-
sequences considers the role of disruption in generat-
ing a perceived crisis that opens a window for political 
actors to advance reforms.13
The Protest Perspective
Under the protest perspective, Cloward and Piv-
en have advanced a theory identifying the conditions 
under which governments are more likely to respond 
to public disruption with conciliatory or repressive 
action.14 Cloward and Piven conceive of public dis-
ruption as the withdrawal of a contribution to critical 
institutions. For Cloward and Piven, riots are a last-
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resort tactic for marginalized groups. Because mar-
ginalized groups are often excluded from mainstream 
institutions, the only contribution to society they can 
withhold is their “quiescence in civil life.”15 
When choosing between courses of action to 
respond to public disruption, governments face dif-
ferent risks and costs. Employing solely repressive, co-
ercive action is an option during periods of electoral 
stability, but it is difficult for governments to predict 
whether such action may agitate outside groups. Un-
less political actors can cast rioters as outsiders and 
mobilize popular hatred against them, political actors 
face uncertain repercussions for the use of force.
The other option available to governments is ap-
peasing and disarming rioters. According to Cloward 
and Piven, this can occur in three main ways. First, 
governments may make symbolic or tangible conces-
sions to alleviate grievances thought to motivate riot-
ing. Second, governments may channel the energies 
of rioters into less disruptive forms of behavior, such 
as by coopting riot leaders into more established po-
litical processes. Third, governments may take action 
that appears to meet the moral demands of the col-
lective action, but which intentionally undermines the 
public’s sympathy for the rioters. By giving themselves 
the appearance of being balanced and judicious, gov-
ernments neutralize rioters by making them appear 
unreasonable, clearing the path for repressive action. 
Cloward and Piven argue that expanding government 
benefits can be a useful social control mechanism to 
neutralize riots and prevent rioting.16 A number of 
empirical studies support this social control thesis, 
finding that riots tend to prompt short-term expan-
sions of government relief, including increased levels 
of welfare spending17 and the expansion of welfare rolls.18 
Cloward and Piven’s theory suggests that the 
public’s perception of rioters influences the govern-
ment’s choice to take either repressive or conciliatory 
action. At the same time, political actors can play a 
role in undermining rioters and manipulating percep-
tions of events to strategic ends. This paper explores 
more broadly how political actors construct riots and 
rioters to facilitate some forms of action and to block 
others. 
Recognizing that riots can be subject to varying 
interpretations highlights a limitation in Cloward and 
Piven’s theory, as well as in the broader literature. This 
limitation stems from the assumption that riots nec-
essarily embody a set of political goals and that it is 
theoretically possible to determine what actions truly 
count as conciliatory. In the case of the 2011 English 
riots, the very existence of political grievances was a 
point of contention. The U.S. riots of the 1960s and 
1970s may be considered a special case, in which cer-
tain actors were especially well positioned to lay claims 
to the existence and substance of political grievance, 
so much so that social scientists took their claims as 
assumptions in their analyses. 
Arriving at a more generalizable understanding 
of how riots exert influence requires moving past the 
notion that riots embody political goals against which 
we can adjudicate their success. It requires first investi-
gating how political actors arrive at an official account 
of the political motivations of rioters and how these 
actors determine if, indeed, such motivations exist at 
all. This is not to claim that all riots are apolitical, but 
rather to argue that the consequences of riots operate 
through the constructed meaning of riots. 
The Crisis Perspective
A second perspective, advanced by John Keeler, 
links crises to political impact through his concept of 
“windows for reform.”19 Keeler defines a crisis as “a 
situation of large-scale public dissatisfaction or even 
fear stemming from wide-ranging economic prob-
lems and/or an unusual degree of social unrest and/or 
threats to national security.”20 He suggests that win-
dows may open as electoral mandates interact with 
crisis situations. He identifies three causal mechanisms 
through which crises can promote political change. 
Through the crisis-mandate mechanism, a crisis can 
undermine the incumbent political regime and em-
power a new government to press for reform. Through 
the urgency mechanism, government officials become 
less cautious or concerned about procedure, as there 
is a perceived need to act quickly to prevent the crisis 
from escalating. Through the fear mechanism, states 
are compelled to immediate action by the endanger-
ment of life and property. 
This paper contributes to Keeler’s crisis perspec-
tive by examining how the interpretive process shapes 
what type of crisis riots are said to represent. Addition-
ally, it explores how politicians contribute to the fear 
and urgency mechanisms as they debate the meaning 
of the riots. It demonstrates how the construction of 
the riots and rioters by politicians, the news media, 
and researchers built a crisis of public order and a 
crisis of social breakdown, lending to specific policy 
prescriptions. 
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FRAMES AND FRAMING PROCESSES 
This study’s analytical approach is centered on 
the concept of a frame. Frames are “schemata of in-
terpretation” that allow people to “locate, perceive, 
identify, and label occurrences within their life space 
and the world at large.”21 Frames are the lenses we 
use to see the world, helping to organize experience 
and guide action.22 Because frames filter what we see, 
they contain “little tacit theories about what exists, 
what happens, and what matters.”23 They can thus 
“promote a particular problem definition, causal in-
terpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment rec-
ommendation.”24 The process of framing refers to the 
active, dynamic processes of meaning construction.25 
The product of framing is a collective action frame, 
which is “intended to mobilize potential adherents 
and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists.”26
The collective action framing literature has fo-
cused on framing from the perspective of social move-
ment organizations. In the case of the 2011 English ri-
ots, there was no movement representing the rioters 
to strategically generate frames for understanding the 
riots. Instead, external actors articulated frames. The 
theoretical concepts advanced in the literature, how-
ever, remain relevant when adapted to this case. One 
central difference is that political actors responding 
to the riots may advance competing frames that aim 
to block or deflect politically disadvantageous action. 
Thus, a frame may be articulated to maintain the sta-
tus quo rather than promote social change.
Snow and Benford discuss three “core framing 
tasks” for collective action frames: diagnostic framing 
(identifying the problem and attributing responsibil-
ity for it), prognostic framing (articulating a solution 
to the problem), and motivational framing (providing 
a call to arms for collective action).27 In response to 
riots, these tasks may be complicated if we consider, 
for example, the potential interest of groups to neu-
tralize the event if it threatens to undermine their 
power or harm their electoral chances. As such, moti-
vational framing need not necessarily be a desired task 
for all frames. 
Social movement scholars have further identi-
fied two interacting factors that influence a frame’s 
mobilizing potency: the credibility of the frame and 
its relative salience.28 A frame is credible to the extent 
that empirical evidence is accepted as “true,” it is inter-
nally consistent, and its articulators are perceived as 
credible sources.29 Its salience, on the other hand, is 
influenced by the congruence between the frame and 
its targets’ experiences, the centrality of the features of 
the frame to its targets’ lives, and the frame’s narrative 
fidelity with the prevailing cultural narrative.
This paper considers the roles of actors in news 
media, research, politics, and policy-making in the 
debate on what the riots represented and how best to 
respond to them. The media can play a role in produc-
ing and disseminating frames through its reporting 
and editorial decisions. It mediates political messag-
ing and legitimizes asymmetrical power relations by 
establishing elite views as commonsensical views.30 
At the same time, it may constrain discourse by shap-
ing public opinion. Researchers can also influence the 
framing of events, as their claims to knowledge and 
expertise are bolstered by their professional status, 
amplifying their voices.31
All actors are embedded in fields with rules that 
structure what frames they are more likely to produce 
and how likely those frames are to be disseminated.32 
These fields, however, overlap. News publications and 
think tanks in England, for example, often have insti-
tutional ties to particular politicians or parties. These 
ties may shape how much these bodies communicate 
with the government and how likely politicians are to 
accept or make use of their work. 
Drawing on the concept of frames, this paper ad-
dresses the following questions: 
1) What frames were advanced to explain the ri-
ots? Who produced them, how were they dissemi-
nated, and how did they interact with each other? 
Did a dominant discourse emerge? 
2) Did early framing activities constrain subse-
quent steps in the interpretive process? How did 
they influence the dynamics of research into the 
riots? How did new information about the riots 
interact with existing accounts? 
3) Did the framing of the riots contribute to defin-
ing a crisis or multiple crises? How did it structure 
political action? 
DATA AND METHODS 
I analyzed primary documents and conducted 
twelve interviews with actors in politics, journalism, 
and research. Texts examined include a sample of 325 
newspaper articles on the riots published in seven of 
the most widely circulated national newspapers in 
Britain between August 6 and December 31, 2011. I 
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also examined three major research reports published 
on the riots: Reading the Riots by The Guardian and 
the London School of Economics, The August Riots 
in England by the National Centre for Social Research 
(commissioned by the Cabinet Office), and 5 Days in 
August by the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, 
a five-member panel appointed by the government. 
To study the political rhetoric of the government’s re-
sponse, I also analyzed House of Commons debates 
conducted between August and December of 2011, 
along with government reports cited or presented in 
Parliament. As follow-up, I analyzed the Riots, Com-
munities and Victims Panel’s final report and the 
government’s official response to the panel’s policy 
recommendations. Analyses proceeded inductively, 
following the approach for grounded theory.33 I paid 
particular attention to who was enabled to speak, what 
they said, and how others responded to the frames 
they articulated. 
EARLY FRAMINGS
Duggan’s death, the first domino to fall in the 
2011 English riots, played a central role in the news 
media’s initial framing of the riots. In the first days of 
the disorder, rioting in Tottenham was framed as an 
expression of the community’s frustration with the 
police. The news media linked the peaceful march on 
the Tottenham police station to the subsequent vio-
lence. News reports emphasized that many of the riot-
ers targeted the police and contextualized the events 
in historical examples of riots fuelled by tensions with 
the police. Nods to the 1985 riots at Broadwater Farm, 
commonly understood as a signifier of strain between 
the predominantly white police force and the black 
youth in the area at the time, suggested that histori-
cally rooted issues in community-police relations may 
help explain the rioting.
News reports also furthered the view that the ri-
ots represented a community’s fury overflowing into 
violence through quotations attributed to community 
members and Duggan’s family. In The Sunday Times, 
a friend of Duggan is quoted saying, “There’s hostil-
ity here, there might even be an uprising, you don’t 
know. Mark held Broadwater Farm together.” 34 On 
the same day, The Guardian reported that community 
leaders with knowledge of Tottenham had warned po-
lice that there would be “’significant’ community reac-
tion to Duggan’s death,” and that the protest “could get 
out of control.”35 Both The Mirror and The Sun also 
cite Duggan’s brother: “I know people are frustrated. 
They are angry at the moment, but I would say please 
try and hold it down.”36 Although Duggan’s brother 
seeks to distance the family from the violence, these 
articles establish the riots as an unauthorized exten-
sion of the earlier protest and establish Duggan’s fam-
ily members as rightful authorities on the events. 
However, concern about Duggan quickly erod-
ed. In the newspaper sample for this study, Dug-
gan’s death is most discussed between August 7 and 
August 9. Duggan’s death was cited in 80 percent of 
articles published on August 7, 60 percent of articles 
on August 8, and 41 percent of articles on August 9. 
But early interest declined sharply. By the tenth and 
eleventh, that figure dropped to 15 percent and 20 
percent respectively and never rose above 6 percent in 
the months that followed. By the end, articles typically 
included only a single sentence identifying Duggan’s 
death as the riots’ initial spark. 
Declining interest in Duggan’s death was accom-
panied by a pivotal shift in how newspapers and politi-
cians framed the relationship between the rioters and 
the community. Whereas the community was initially 
framed as an aggrieved party lashing out in violence, 
it was later extricated from the rioters and presented 
as the “peaceful majority”37 of “innocent local resi-
dents.”38 Grievances related to Duggan’s death were 
relegated to “anger felt by some.”39 The Labour MP 
for Tottenham, David Lammy, was particularly in-
fluential in disseminating this view. Lammy penned 
editorials in The Guardian40 and The Times41 and 
was widely quoted declaring that the violence was not 
perpetrated on behalf of the community but rather 
against it—that it had “ripped the heart out” of the 
community. In a statement praised in The Daily Tele-
graph, Lammy said:
The vast majority of people in Tottenham reject 
what happened here…. This is nothing like the 
sorts of scenes we saw in Tottenham 25 years ago. 
Then, there was a particular relationship with the 
police. This is an attack on ordinary people, shop-
keepers, women, children.... 42 
In this statement, Lammy disassociates the riots 
from historical examples of disorder caused by griev-
ances with the police. He attributes the riots to people 
outside of the true Tottenham community and identi-
fies members of the community as victims. 
Constructing a dichotomy between the commu-
nity and the rioters allowed politicians and the news 
media to also construct a dichotomy between the pro-
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test and the violence. These moves allowed those who 
marched on the police station to still be considered 
part of the community while the rioters were cast out 
and isolated as a distinct Other.43  
RIOTERS AND THE COMMUNITY
Rioters were portrayed with some diversity across 
different news sources and over time. They were ini-
tially depicted as mobs of masked and hooded young 
men. The Guardian was atypical among newspapers 
for providing detailed and personal descriptions of ri-
oters. It reported things rioters said, including insults 
rioters yelled at the police. It also described rioters’ ac-
tions. In some cases, Guardian writers attributed mo-
tivations to rioters’ seemingly self-interested actions, 
maintaining that “early rioting was not without some 
social symbolism.”44 
The bulk of later coverage, however, particular-
ly from conservative news outlets, generally negated 
the possibility that the rioters could be politically ag-
grieved community members. Instead, the coverage 
adopted multiple approaches to portray rioters as 
apolitical, self-interested aggressors. First, newspa-
pers selected anecdotes that suggested rioters were 
cavalier and brazen in their illegal actions. Frequently 
cited examples include rioters taking time to carefully 
pick what to steal and pretending to help others while 
robbing them. Second, newspapers depicted rioters as 
indiscriminately violent, offering examples of unwar-
ranted violence against innocent and unlikely targets. 
Stressing the randomness of the rioters’ actions, such 
examples suggested that rioters threatened all. Third, 
newspapers cast rioters as inscrutable, describing ri-
oters harming others without securing any clear per-
sonal gains. One often cited example was the theft of 
an elderly barber’s old teakettle. Victims of the riot-
ers’ actions were often called on to diagnose the ri-
oters’ motivations. Consistently, victims claimed that 
rioters were motivated by simple criminality. Fourth, 
newspapers suggested rioters were driven by material 
gain. Descriptions focused on details about the types 
of stores looted, the brands of the clothing stolen, and 
the electronics carted off. 
Intermingled throughout news pieces and edito-
rials was a concern with gangs, which seemed to be 
taken for granted as the groups responsible for the 
violence. Some editorials lamented that the riots dis-
played the perniciousness of gangs, as though it were 
self-evident that gangs caused the rioting. Rioters were 
most frequently referred to, in order from greatest to 
least frequency, as looters, thugs, yobs, hooligans, and 
anarchists. Rioters were also frequently identified as 
youth. News articles often claimed that gangs con-
trolled the majority of these youth involved. 
While rioters were framed as hostile, alien aggres-
sors motivated by greed and opportunism, the com-
munity members came to be framed as victims and 
defenders of society. As victims, community members 
bore the heavy costs of the riots. They witnessed the 
rioters destroying the products of their community’s 
past accomplishments and damaging their commu-
nity’s future prospects. Throughout the newspaper 
coverage pervades a sense of injustice. The innocent 
community, framed to stand in direct contrast to the 
guilty rioters, did not deserve to suffer the costs. This 
sense of injustice is heightened in news accounts that 
highlight individual sympathetic victims. Unlike the 
rioters, who were described as a mob, community 
members were distinguished as distinct human beings 
with histories, families, and occupations. Featured in-
dividuals often included small business owners and 
immigrant families with narratives about businesses 
and homes that rioters destroyed overnight. 
Community members were framed as defenders 
of their neighborhoods and, more broadly, of Brit-
ish society in three ways. First, newspapers described 
community members physically defending commu-
nity property from attack. Protecting hospitals and 
schools, these community members were portrayed 
as heroic crusaders fending off destructive invaders. 
Second, newspapers described community members 
stepping up to help maintain public order by creating 
websites “to catch a looter” and reporting suspected 
rioters.
Third, post-riot coverage highlighted commu-
nity-initiated cleanup efforts. Descriptions of these 
efforts featured militaristic imagery, including the 
“mobilization” of volunteers “armed with brooms.”45 
Cleanup events were infused with meaning on two 
levels. On one level, cleanup events constituted liter-
ally taking the streets back from the rioters. On an-
other level, cleanup events reclaimed the community 
spiritually and symbolically. They reassembled the 
community and reasserted the true meaning of com-
munity. According to editorial writers and politicians, 
cleanup events also reclaimed British identity.46 The 
model citizens who participated in the cleanup events 
were said to constitute the decisive majority of British 
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society, while the rioters were said to constitute only 
a small minority. Only the actions of the rule-abiding, 
community-minded majority accurately exemplified 
the British spirit. 
EMERGENCY PARLIAMENTARY SESSION
David Cameron called an emergency session of 
Parliament on August 11, 2011, initiating the first ma-
jor structured political debate on the meaning, causes, 
and implications of the riots. The debate served as an 
important discursive moment in which influential 
elected officials laid claims to appropriate interpreta-
tions of the riots. In the debate, politicians reinforced 
existing frames advanced in the media. The debate 
elucidated discursive rules that stipulated what terms 
could not be applied to the riots and offered politi-
cians tools for gaining legitimacy in the debate. 
The debate demonstrated how much Duggan’s 
death had been marginalized and reinforced the view 
that Duggan’s death could not explain the riots. Dug-
gan’s sidelining took with it concerns over relations 
between communities and the police. While the me-
dia identified the issue early on as a possible cause of 
the riots, politicians in Parliament dismissed it. In his 
opening statement, the prime minister stated: 
It is completely wrong to say there is any justifi-
able causal link [between the demonstrations and the 
actions of ‘opportunist thugs in gangs’]. It is simply 
preposterous for anyone to suggest that people loot-
ing in Tottenham at the weekend, still less three days 
later in Salford, were in any way doing so because of 
the death of Mark Duggan. Young people stealing flat-
screen televisions and burning shops—that was not 
about politics or protest, it was about theft.47
Cameron appealed to common sense by using 
the term “simply preposterous” and established his ac-
count as factually indisputable. He reinforced that the 
riots were apolitical three more times in the debate, 
stating, “Of course one should not jump to conclu-
sions.... This was not political protest, or a riot about 
protest or politics — it was common garden thieving, 
robbing, and looting, and we do not need an inquiry 
to tell us that.”48 The prime minister maintained that 
the riots represent “criminality, pure and simple.”49 
The debate is constrained against framing the 
riots in terms of political grievance. As MPs raised 
competing explanations for the riots, no one referred 
to the riots as protest. The term “protest” used in refer-
ence to anything other than the initial demonstration 
was delegitimized by the prime minister’s remarks, 
which from the outset limited what could be consid-
ered reasonable and acceptable. This injunction was 
reinforced by other MPs, most strongly by Conserva-
tives but also by members of the other two major par-
ties. 
Inextricably linked with this injunction was the 
assertion that participating in the riots was a crimi-
nal act. This assertion implicated several further ideas 
that served as tools in discursive practice for political 
actors to demonstrate literacy in the mainstream dis-
course. Because the actions consisted of criminality, 
those who performed them were criminals. Being a 
criminal is then stated to be a matter of choice. This el-
ement of choice is of paramount importance because 
it means that the actions are a matter of individual ini-
tiative and the weight of blame should accordingly be 
placed on the individual. It then follows that the ap-
propriate institution to which the rioters should be di-
verted is the criminal justice system. Fragments of this 
reasoning were reproduced as refrains throughout the 
debate, most notably in repeated statements that there 
could be no excuses for the rioters’ actions.
REACHING FOR CAUSES, DEFINING CRISES 
During the debate, politicians aiming to pin-
point the causes of the riots defined what crises the 
riots represented. Politicians established two crises: 
one of public order and one of social breakdown. The 
former was mapped onto issues with police tactics and 
the latter was mapped onto issues with gangs. 
Crisis of Public Order
In the debate, politicians were most urgently 
concerned about preventing rioting in the immediate 
future. It was said that the riots represented and were 
caused by a public order crisis, a breakdown in respect 
for the law and in the law’s ability to prevent crime. 
While politicians argued that courts would need 
to play an important role in making it clear that crime 
does not pay, they most frequently raised concerns 
about policing. Politicians criticized the police for al-
lowing the streets to descend into lawlessness, having 
diagnosed the crisis of public order as a policing prob-
lem. Politicians questioned police tactics and powers 
and cited concerns about police numbers and resources. 
Notably missing from the debate was substantive 
engagement with questions on relations between the 
police and communities. The interest in policing was 
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largely limited to concerns about the police’s ability to 
maintain order, with the implicit assumption that had 
policing been more effective during the disorder, the 
riots would never have grown. There was no real in-
terest in how police operations prior to the riots may 
have created background conditions that fuelled the 
riots.  
Crisis of Social Breakdown 
In trying to explain what motivated individu-
als to riot, politicians performed a careful balancing 
act of affirming their view that the riots represented 
criminality while grasping at the social context that 
promoted the violence. The focus on criminality lim-
ited the scope of the debate on social context. It cen-
tered the conversation on trying to understand how 
society could have allowed so many people to become 
criminals. Politicians repeatedly emphasized that so-
cial conditions did not motivate rioters to consciously 
react in protest. They argued that rioters were instead 
motivated by greed, materialism, and criminality. So-
ciety was too permissive, eroding personal responsi-
bility.  
Echoing the Broken Britain thesis, David Cam-
eron, Theresa May, and several MPs stated that the 
riots represented a crisis of social breakdown, that a 
broad swath of British society was sick. As Theresa 
May stated:
No one doubts that the violence that we have 
seen over the past five days is a symptom of some-
thing very deeply wrong with our society. Children 
celebrated as they smashed their way into shops. Men 
in sports cars arrived at stores to steal goods. Women 
tried on trainers before they stole them. A teaching as-
sistant was caught looting. Thugs pretended to help an 
injured young man but robbed him. They are shock-
ing images, but they are in fact symbols of a deeper 
malaise in our society.50
Politicians identified a variety of factors that 
may have contributed to a broad crisis of social break-
down, including a lack of parental responsibility, un-
employment, and failures in the education system. Yet 
all these factors were mapped onto one specific set of 
people: gangs. Conservatives discussed gangs most 
frequently, though Labour MPs, including Opposition 
Leader Ed Miliband, also agreed that “at the heart of 
all the violence [sat] the issue of the street gangs.”51 In 
the debate, politicians mapped the broad social break-
down crisis onto gangs, a defined, narrow segment of 
society commonly associated with crime. 
ARTICULATING AND ENFORCING RULES 
Public critiques of media and political figures 
that strayed too far from the accepted narrative of 
the riots served to articulate and enforce discursive 
rules. An example was made of the Labour-affiliated 
former mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, when he 
published a brief statement opining on the causes be-
hind the riots early on in the debate. Newspapers and 
politicians condensed his argument and declared that 
Livingstone blamed the events on government spend-
ing cuts.52 Conservative papers blasted Livingstone 
for trying to score points in the upcoming mayoral 
race, wrongfully making excuses, and shifting the 
blame away from the rioters. Livingstone’s statement 
was used as a foil for favored interpretations that high-
lighted the criminality of the rioters. 
The injunction against using the term “protest” 
was reinforced by articles criticizing the BBC. The 
Daily Telegraph printed a news piece that questioned 
the “political correctness” of “senior BBC present-
ers and reporters on the ground” who “continually 
[referred] to the yobs rioting across London as ‘pro-
testers.’”53 The Sun also published an article which 
paraphrased the mayor of London as “blasting” the 
BBC and included the quote: “To call them protesters 
is insulting to people who have a legitimate political 
protest. The fundamental motive was crime.”54 These 
articles broadly publicized infractions and raised the 
stakes for misspeaking. 
Ultimately, the left also appeared to accept the 
norm that the riots could not be interpreted as pro-
test. The BBC apologized publicly for referring to riot-
ers as protesters. This apology was covered not only 
by The Telegraph but also the left-leaning Guardian, 
which appeared to support the BBC’s apology as the 
right thing to do.55 Using the term protest was thus 
broadly accepted as prohibited practice.
CONTENTION IN RESEARCH
In the five months following the riots, three ma-
jor research projects were launched to understand the 
nature and causes of the riots. These projects served as 
important opportunities to generate new frames and 
enhance the credibility of existing frames. Early con-
structions of the rioters and the community shaped 
the dynamics of this knowledge production activity 
following the riots. The early delegitimization of the 
rioters and elevation of the community conditioned 
the design, findings, and impact of these projects by 
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shaping who was considered a legitimate voice. Only 
strategically positioned actors could overcome these 
constraints and expand the bounds of conversation in 
meaningful, though limited ways.
Research Backdrop and Research Design 
Interviews with individuals involved in each of 
the projects highlighted that a project’s research design 
influenced what kind of research findings emerged 
as most salient. Research design decisions were not 
sterile exercises in determining the most scientifically 
rigorous way to arrive at the truth. Rather, they em-
bodied assumptions about what voices should to be 
privileged over others. They constituted decisions as 
to whose version of the truth should be taken as the 
authoritative account. 
The Riots, Victims and Communities Panel’s 
creation was a compromise between the three main 
political parties. Labour was keen on a review, but 
the Conservatives were not. The Conservatives were 
compelled to agree to a cross-party review because “it 
would be more embarrassing to have a review they 
couldn’t control … they’d rather be in the tent than 
outside the tent.”56 Advisers within each of the parties 
mapped out the study’s research questions and design. 
The project was mandated to gather a broad range of 
perspectives, though with a focus on listening to the 
community. 
The heavier weighting afforded to the views of 
community members influenced the results published 
in the report. According to an adviser to the panel, 
community members were more likely to offer short-
term explanations for the riots (that rioters wanted to 
steal and saw an opportunity to do so, that some were 
criminals in the past and had no real reservations 
about exploiting the chance), while the rioters ex-
pressed longer-term reservations (“antipathy to place, 
a sense of hopelessness, no respect”).57 Asked why he 
felt this difference existed, the adviser expressed skep-
ticism about the reliability of rioters. He said that riot-
ers were more likely to make up justifications because 
saying they stole for personal gain would be frowned 
upon. The panel accordingly subjected the rioters’ re-
sponses to greater scrutiny. Claims from rioters that 
deviated from the explanation that they were crimi-
nals motivated by material self-interest were automat-
ically deemed suspect against the dominant narrative. 
The panel received some publicity prior to the 
publication of Five Days in August, though much of 
the publicity was negative. An editorial published in 
The Guardian in October suggested that “if the panel 
is just a sounding board it should not pretend to be 
more than that and come clean about its inability to 
effect change.”58 Another editorial, published in The 
Telegraph, echoed the sentiment that the panel was 
politically impotent.59 The government inquiry is de-
scribed as “in progress—not that anyone has noticed” 
and “ a pretty low-quality investigation that is expect-
ed to add nothing to our general understanding.” 
Yet, the very fact that the panel received atten-
tion at all indicates that it was on the political radar. 
The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) 
study, by contrast, was not discussed in any of the 
news articles in the sample. Established following a 
speech by Nick Clegg during a Liberal Democrat con-
ference, the goal of the project was to understand the 
motivations and the role of young people.60  While 
the Cabinet Office was officially the body that com-
missioned the study, it was largely the Liberal Demo-
crats who pushed it through. Given such a tie to the 
government, how widely the project’s findings were 
disseminated was more directly contingent on wheth-
er politicians wanted to make them public. 
The Guardian-LSE project was a collaboration 
led by Paul Lewis, a journalist at The Guardian, and 
Tim Newburn, Head of the Social Policy Department 
at the London School of Economics. This collabora-
tion was well positioned from the start to be highly 
visible. With institutional ties to a major news pub-
lication, the project had a readymade dissemination 
platform. Ties to a major, well-respected research 
institution further enhanced the project’s credibility. 
The project received considerable publicity from the 
start. The Guardian published more articles on the 
riots than any other publication, situating itself as a 
central institution through which debate about the ri-
ots would filter. 
The first phase of The Guardian-LSE project con-
sisted of interviews with rioters, a decision consciously 
made against the grain of the dominant understand-
ing of who should be allowed to speak on the riots. 
An important member of the project team argued 
that gathering the perspectives of rioters is essential 
for understanding the riots. From its inception, The 
Guardian-LSE sought an alternative to the dominant 
frames and positioned itself to generate new frames 
for understanding the rioters—ones that would place 
the rioters themselves at the center. 
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WHAT FRAMES DID THE REPORTS ADVANCE? 
The Guardian-LSE Project 
The Guardian-LSE project frames poor relations 
between the community and the police in high poverty 
areas as a principal cause of the riots. While other fac-
tors like opportunism and materialism played a role, 
the riots were, at the core, an expression of pent-up 
tensions in neglected communities. This frame stands 
in direct opposition to the dominant account that sug-
gests that “what began as a protest against the police 
shooting of Mark Duggan was stripped of political 
meaning before it spread across the country, fuelled 
by ‘mindless’ and ‘copycat’ opportunists.”61
Policing issues are presented as an overarching 
theme in the interviews. Rioters expressed their dis-
pleasure with the police, particularly on the subject 
of stop-and-search, a power that police have to stop 
individuals they deem suspicious and search them for 
illegal goods. They partially attributed their actions 
to their attitudes toward the police. In the section on 
gangs, for example, the report states that “a sense of 
a common enemy, a common cause”62 caused rival 
gangs to cooperate against the police. 
The section in the report on inequality empha-
sizes the existence of political grievance most strongly, 
opening with the quote: “I still to this day don’t class 
it as a riot...I think it was a protest.”63 The report dis-
cusses how rioters felt alienated from the rest of soci-
ety, faced limited job opportunities, and felt invisible. 
Even in the section on opportunism and looting, the 
report connects the rioters’ actions to larger political 
motivations; rioters were “reacting to a society fu-
elled by greed” and “resenting being excluded from 
a consumerist world.”64 Rioting was a logical, if con-
demned, form of political action.  
The report largely considers the speech of rioters 
to be reliable and authoritative. Consider the closing 
of the section on policing:
The mayhem saw rioters take control back, in their 
own minds, from the clutches of the police—who 
were seen as a corrupting influence in the com-
munity. This is not to justify the riots but in part 
explains why, for many rioters, they are not trou-
bled by the moral implications of what occurred.65 
This quotation signals the acceptance of discur-
sive norms, as it anticipates potential dismissals of this 
finding on the grounds that it provides justification for 
the rioters’ actions. 
The report synthesizes and evaluates the view-
points gleaned from the interviews. An extra layer 
of interpretation in the report becomes noticeable in 
moments of speculative language, for example: “Mem-
ories of black people in Tottenham whose deaths have 
been linked to police hands don’t fade easily—perhaps 
making Duggan’s death even more potent.”66 The re-
port’s authors are positioned as an authoritative, cen-
tralizing voice in relation to the rioters. The authors 
draw high-level connections that the respondents did 
not make themselves. While the project draws the ri-
oters’ views into the public discourse, it still ultimately 
controls how they are released to the public.    
The NatCen Report
The NatCen report suggests many complex inter-
acting factors led youth to riot. NatCen offers a typol-
ogy of involvement, sorting participants into one of 
four categories: watchers, rioters, looters, and the non-
involved. Of particular interest are the sub-categories 
included under rioters: protesters, retaliators, and 
thrill seekers. Protesters are described as those who 
got involved in the riots because of “specific issues or 
events, in particular the police handling of the Mark 
Duggan case in Tottenham.”67 Retaliators were those 
who wanted to get back at the police for longer-term 
grievances, seeing the riots as an opportunity to “get 
one over [on]” the police. The report suggests griev-
ances against the police are broadly shared, stating:
The view that some young people were more like-
ly to get involved in the riots because of previous 
negative experiences with the police was clearly 
expressed across the sample. There were few posi-
tive comments about the police in general, even 
from young people who were not involved in the 
riots”68
The report points to the existence of political 
motivations, but establishes these motivations as one 
among many sets of possible motivations. 
The NatCen report anticipates potential chal-
lenges to its findings rooted in the delegitimization of 
the rioters. In one section, it acknowledges that “[it] 
may well be suggested that ‘blaming the power of the 
group’ is a convenient post-hoc rationalization, tai-
lored to put a socially desirable spin on what were an-
tisocial events.”69 But the report offers three points to 
counter such a reading: the prison interviewees were 
quick to acknowledge they had committed a crime, 
they were comfortable disclosing previous convic-
tions, and they offered complex explanations that also 
included motivations based on individual material 
gain. In this example, the report engages with the pre-
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vailing discourse and proactively defends the honesty 
of interviewees’ responses against unfair criticism. 
Riots, Communities and Victims Panel
The Riots, Communities and Victims Panel re-
port is devoted to synthesizing the views of the com-
munity members, which are presented as facts that 
should inform policy. Five Days in August clearly 
states the rioters’ motivations: “Individuals–including 
those who rioted–highlighted a range of motivations, 
from immediate gratification of a free pair of train-
ers, to a desire to attack society.”70 It notes that “some 
[community members] felt a number of people might 
have been influenced by the wish to protest” the police 
handling of Mark Duggan’s death or stop-and-search 
practices.71 But the report devotes merely a page to 
stop-and-search procedures and does not connect 
stop-and-search to the riots. It opens only a limited 
door to political grievance, setting it aside and dis-
missing it as analytically distinct from the rest of the 
rioting.  
Rioters are depoliticized in the participant ty-
pology presented in the report. They are categorized 
as organized criminals, violent aggressors, late night 
shoppers, opportunists, and spectators. Violent ag-
gressors are described as those “responsible for serious 
offences against the police and for cases of arson, set-
ting light both to cars and residential premises.”72 In 
this typology, actions targeting the police are grouped 
together with arson. Unlike the NatCen typology, 
there is no space for political motivation.  
According to the report, underlying factors that 
explain why so many people “abused society’s moral 
and legal codes when the opportunity arose”73 in-
clude a lack of hopes and dreams, low personal resil-
ience, poor parenting, consumerism, repeat offending, 
and perceptions of community policing. Of particular 
note is personal resilience, which is defined as being 
ambitious, optimistic, and self-sufficient in the face of 
hardship. The report cites examples of young people 
who remain positive despite limited opportunities 
while their peers do not. This idea offers an important 
conceptual tool to emphasize that social context is 
not deterministic, shifting the weight of responsibility 
back to individuals.
Five Days in August explores several subjects 
not covered in other reports. These subjects reinforce 
the construction of the community as victim and de-
fender. The report includes sections on community 
cleanup efforts and the impact of the riots on com-
munities. Documenting the victimization of the com-
munity, case studies of community members offer the 
same narratives as those featured in newspapers. The 
construction of the community as a defender emerges 
clearly in discussions of community cleanup efforts. It 
is stated that “[following] the riots, communities mo-
bilized to undo what the rioters had done. Horror at 
what had happened motivated people to demonstrate 
shared values and show that the rioters’ actions were 
not in their names.”74 The community’s cleanup ac-
tivity is framed as a purposive, symbolic act to draw 
a boundary between the community and the rioters. 
The community’s actions testify to the “true” commu-
nity’s moral superiority.
RECEPTION TO RESEARCH
The three reports were published within weeks 
of each other. The NatCen report was released on No-
vember 2, 2011, followed by Five Days in August on 
November 28, 2011, and Reading the Riots on De-
cember 5, 2011. The NatCen report did not gain trac-
tion in the media; not a single newspaper piece in the 
sample referenced it and interviews confirmed that it 
did not attract substantial public attention. 
The press, by contrast, picked up Five Days in Au-
gust and Reading the Riots. Newspapers adopted two 
approaches for reporting the research findings. One 
approach was to accept the research by harmonizing 
it with prevailing accounts of the riots. The panel’s re-
search was subjected to this first approach. The Daily 
Telegraph and The Daily Mail supported the panel 
and presented its findings as definitive and trustwor-
thy.75 Its findings were reduced to the narrative that 
the riots were caused by greed and spread when peo-
ple saw that the police were ineffective at containing 
the disorder. A Daily Telegraph piece, “‘New religion’ 
of greed blamed for rioting,” for example, opened 
with the statement: “A culture of greed exacerbated 
by police inaction was to blame for the summer’s ri-
ots, an official report has found.”76 The Guardian-LSE 
research was also subjected to this approach by The 
Daily Mirror, which claimed that the findings revealed 
that “greed and a desire to exploit a ‘once in a lifetime’ 
chance to steal were key motives behind the summer 
riots.”77 This simplified frame largely omits each re-
port’s discussion of community-police relations.
A second approach newspapers adopted was to 
the reject the research by attacking its credibility. This 
17
to construct a riot: interpretations and consequences of the 2011 english riots
tactic was used repeatedly against Reading the Riots. 
The Daily Mail attacked the project’s methodology and 
argued that the project only sought to shift blame away 
from the rioters. Its critiques demonstrated the ways 
in which the project violated discursive norms. Partic-
ularly significant among the newspaper’s output was 
a scathing piece entitled “Apologists for the Mob”78 
that attacked the credibility of both the research sub-
jects and the researchers. It sarcastically notes that 
the report declares the rioters victims whose “griev-
ances deserve to be heard.” It also turned to the Riots, 
Community and Victims Panel’s research, suggesting 
that its finding that the riots were driven by greed was 
“surely what anyone—without a political agenda—al-
ready knew.” The piece further undercut the impar-
tiality of the researchers, stating that the project was 
“little more than Left-wing claptrap dressed up as se-
rious academic research.” The article did concede that 
the police were not blameless in the riots but limited 
this blame to their inability to contain riots. 
The Guardian-LSE project was unique, however, 
in that it had considerable control over how its find-
ings were disseminated. The Guardian was able to 
publish a series of articles capturing different dimen-
sions of the project’s findings, an advantage that al-
lowed the project to make a major media splash. The 
Guardian clearly established the project’s overarching 
message on its own terms, printing a front-page ar-
ticle that opens with “Widespread anger and frustra-
tion at the way police engage with communities was a 
significant cause of the summer riots in every major 
city where disorder took place, the biggest study into 
their cause has found.”79 The Guardian and LSE also 
organized a conference to discuss the report’s find-
ings. The event was well attended by policymakers 
and researchers. Speakers included Ed Miliband, the 
leader of the Labour Party; Theresa May; Lynne Ow-
ens, deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 
Service; and Louise Casey, the person appointed to 
lead the government’s response to the riots. This list 
of attendees was a testament to the report’s influence 
and visibility. Although some attendees, notably The-
resa May, criticized the report at the conference, the 
conference nonetheless offered a venue to disseminate 
the project’s findings to influential actors.
DIRECTING POLITICAL ACTION
The government’s initial public response to the 
riots came in two parts: actions to address the public 
order crisis and actions to address the social break-
down crisis. During the emergency session of Parlia-
ment, David Cameron announced that he had asked 
his Cabinet to devise an inter-ministry plan to tack-
le gang culture. Complementing this effort, he an-
nounced that he had invited William Bratton, a former 
chief of police of the Los Angeles Police Department, 
to serve as an adviser on gangs. Theresa May further 
announced that the Home Affairs Committee would 
pursue a report on what could be learned from the po-
licing of the riots. These reviews limited the conversa-
tion early on about appropriate solutions to prevent 
future rioting to two specific policy domains: policing 
and gangs. 
Nearly two years after the riots, in July 2013, the 
Department of Communities and Local Government 
issued an official government response to the Riots, 
Communities and Victims Panel’s final report, After 
the Riots, which built off Five Days in August and 
offered policy recommendations. In this document, 
the government presents a sweeping survey of policy 
challenges and policy actions that it suggests captures 
the breadth of issues pertinent to the riots. The gov-
ernment’s authoritative case for how it appropriately 
and effectively responded to the riots two years out is 
broad, but its underlying logic is deeply rooted in the 
terms of debate established in the first months after 
the riots. 
The following sections trace important political 
actions to address the public order and social break-
down crises taken in the first five months following 
the riots and connect these actions to the parameters 
of the government’s final official response to the riots. 
Political Action on the Social Breakdown Crisis
Gangs were positioned at the center of the govern-
ment’s initial efforts to address the social breakdown 
crisis. In the House of Commons, gangs appeared re-
peatedly on the agenda in the fall of 2011. The atten-
tion directed toward gangs was initially clearly framed 
as the government’s strategy to prevent future rioting. 
However, the government had to change course and 
readjust its framing of the issue when the Home Office 
released statistical evidence that suggested that gangs 
did not play a major role in the riots.80 By mid-Sep-
tember, there was already public recognition of this 
discrepancy, with Theresa May conceding that the role 
of gangs was “not as high as people first thought.”81 
The review on gangs was nonetheless completed, pub-
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lished, and presented before Parliament on November 
1, 2011. 
The review’s final report, “Ending Gang and 
Youth Violence,” reflects a significant shift in the way 
the government framed the connection between the 
riots and political action tackling gangs. It takes two 
approaches to resolving the awkwardness of directing 
energy toward gang-related issues when statistics sug-
gest that few rioters were involved in gangs. First, it 
only states that the riots brought the issue of gangs to 
light. It does not claim that tackling gangs would pre-
vent future riots. The executive summary, for exam-
ple, states, “[The] disorder in August was not caused 
solely by gangs but the violence we saw on our streets 
revealed all too vividly the problems that sometimes 
lie below the surface and out of sight.”82 Second, the 
report emphasizes the high costs that gangs impose 
to legitimate its focus on them. The foreword, for ex-
ample, states, “The proportion of rioters known to be 
gang involved may be low...but we must not let that 
distract us from the disproportionate and devastating 
impact they have on some of our most deprived com-
munities.”83 
Echoing the Broken Britain thesis, the report 
suggests that gangs are a symptom of the emergence 
of troubled youth and “troubled families.” The social 
breakdown crisis, graphed onto a minority group of 
troubled youth disengaged from broader society, can 
only be addressed by coordinating policy efforts to 
target these populations in the same way one would 
target a public health outbreak. Accordingly, policy 
prescriptions are designed to zap the source of soci-
ety’s sickness—members of gangs and “120,000 trou-
bled families” with youth.84
Gangs and troubled families with youth were the 
targets of some of the most significant government 
action in the early months following the riots. The 
Troubled Families Team, headed by Louise Casey, was 
created to turn around the “120,000 most troubled 
families” discussed in the report.85  As part of this 
work, David Cameron announced on December 15, 
2011 that the government would establish a network 
of “troubleshooters.” These troubleshooters would be 
assigned to support specific families and would serve 
as a centralizing mechanism for state services. The 
Troubled Families Team was given a budget of £448m 
over four years to implement the program.86
Two years later, in the government’s statement 
in response to the riots, the government presented 
a wide-ranging suite of social policy measures it as-
sociates with preventing and treating the criminality 
in young people that they claim caused the riots. The 
statement presents many of these measures as part of 
broader initiatives that may contribute to preventing 
riots in the future, rather than as specific actions trig-
gered in response to the riots. These measures feature 
policy solutions to improve parenting, including pi-
lots to give parents vouchers for parenting classes and 
efforts to expand home visiting programs for young 
mothers.87 Additional measures discussed include 
efforts to strengthen early childhood education, im-
prove instruction in schools, expand teacher authority 
to discipline students, and direct additional resources 
to disadvantaged students. Arguing that unemploy-
ment can draw young people toward criminality, 
the document also points to efforts to better support 
young people through existing job centers and to 
boost urban economic development. These measures 
spanning policy domains and government agencies 
are all centrally concerned with addressing the early 
diagnosis that the riots were caused by a small subsec-
tion of society—troubled youth and the families that 
produce them—at the heart of the social breakdown 
crisis. 
Political Action on the Public Order Crisis
Early political responses to the public order cri-
sis focused on using the criminal justice system to de-
ter future rioters and on improving the police’s capac-
ity to contain disorder. Concerns about strengthening 
the strategic operations of the police in cases of disor-
der continued to outweigh concerns about commu-
nity-police relations. Concerns about appropriately 
punishing perpetrators prompted immediate puni-
tive action: large rounds of arrests; prison sentences 
quadruple the normally expected lengths for similar 
offences; raids of suspected rioters’ homes; relaxed 
restrictions on publicly disclosing the names and ad-
dresses of young offenders; and support for local au-
thorities to evict households suspected of participat-
ing in the riots from subsidized housing.88 
Two reviews explicitly propelled forward the de-
bate on addressing the public order crisis: one by the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee and 
the other by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). 
Reports from both reviews rearticulate preexisting 
frames in line with the dual crises the government de-
fined. They focus on police tactics to contain disorder: 
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what the police can do to control or disperse rioting 
crowds. Long-term policing concerns, like those ar-
ticulated in Reading the Riots, go largely unaddressed. 
Both reports minimize the importance of Duggan’s 
death; the Home Affairs Committee stipulates that 
Duggan’s death is only relevant to events in Totten-
ham and the MPS discusses the fallout surrounding 
Duggan’s death as an exceptional event of bureaucratic 
mishandling, not as a tipping point in negative rela-
tions with the community. Following the discursive 
norm against considering the riots a protest, the Home 
Affairs Committee report separates Duggan from the 
causal narrative of the riots. It reaffirms the notion 
that the riots were apolitical, stressing that “there does 
not seem to be any clear narrative, nor a clear element 
of protest or clear political objectives.”89 While both 
reports acknowledge concerns about police-commu-
nity relations, neither explores this subject in depth. 
The MPS report conceives of community engagement 
narrowly as engaging the community to prevent po-
tentially controversial events from escalating and 
partnering with communities to contain rioting once 
it is underway. 
While these reviews reinforced the view that a 
public order crisis lay at the heart of the riots, they 
did not completely exclude the possibility of other 
underlying causes. In an important development, 
Theresa May made a low-key announcement at the 
Reading the Riots conference. Despite criticizing The 
Guardian-LSE research, she announced the Home Of-
fice would launch a review of stop-and-search proce-
dures. This announcement represented the first major 
instance in which the political impact of the riots ex-
tended outside the two crises defined previously. Be-
fore the NatCen study and The Guardian-LSE report, 
community-police relations had largely been dropped 
from the discourse. While The Guardian-LSE col-
laboration was panned by conservative newspapers 
and criticized by politicians, it still appeared to cut 
through the dominant discourse, generating enough 
attention that it became impossible to ignore. Theresa 
May was compelled to act even though doing so con-
tradicted her claim that the riots had nothing to do 
with political grievance. 
 This action points optimistically to the possibil-
ity that significant actors can stretch the terms of de-
bate and forge additional pathways of political action, 
even if they are not able to wholly replace the dominant 
frames. Indeed, the Riots, Victims and Communities 
Panel devotes an entire chapter of its final report, pub-
lished three months after Reading the Riots, to issues 
affecting public confidence in the police, even though 
it largely dismissed the issue in its interim report.90 
The panel does not go so far as to say that that rioters 
were politically motivated to riot because of friction 
with the police, but rather suggests that distrust of po-
lice facilitated the criminality behind the riots. More 
cooperative communities would help prevent crime 
and make individuals socially accountable. This alter-
native framing helps to preserve the riots as apolitical 
while putting community-police relations back on the 
table. 
Accordingly, the government acknowledged the 
panel’s concerns about community-police relations. 
Its response statement offers a brief section that high-
lights existing efforts to make policing more transpar-
ent, improve institutional oversight, introduce clearer 
guidance on officer conduct, and promote more judi-
cious use of stop-and-search powers.91 This inclusion 
reflects a reluctant acceptance of community policing 
concerns as a potential cause of the riots. 
Despite this optimistic indicator of broadened 
debate and action, it is important to note that consid-
erably more political energy was invested in resolving 
the public order crisis by enhancing police readiness 
to combat public disorder and by expanding punitive 
powers to deter criminality. Most notably, on the lat-
ter front, the government institutionalized many of 
the exceptional punitive sanctions installed against 
rioters in 2011. The government added provisions 
to a criminal justice reform bill, for example, to en-
able landlords to evict an entire household should one 
member of the household be criminally convicted,92 
effectively collectivizing punishment.93 In addition, 
the government formally provided courts with greater 
powers to punish offenders financially, lifting a cap on 
compensation payment size and expanding access to 
tax, income, and social benefits information.94 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Frame analysis
In the interpretive process following the riots, 
early framing activities by media and political elites 
constrained the subsequent trajectory of debate on the 
meaning and causes of the riots. A crucial question 
that actors addressed in the early stages of the debate 
was whether the events constituted a form of political 
protest. The riots began with a peaceful march but end-
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ed in widespread violence, looting, and destruction of 
property. To what extent the subsequent growth of the 
riots was political in nature was initially unclear. 
The answer to this question lay in the interac-
tion of various frames. The rise in salience of frames 
that distinguished the rioters and the community and 
the corresponding decline in salience of the Duggan 
frame conspired to negate the possibility of interpret-
ing the riots as political protest. Through public criti-
cism of those who suggested the riots were inspired by 
political grievance, conservative newspapers and poli-
ticians established norms for speaking about the riots. 
These norms set the terms of the debate, and actors 
in media and politics broadcast the price of deviating 
from the script by publicly denouncing infractions.
These frames further helped construct two types 
of crises: a public order crisis and a social breakdown 
crisis. Politicians were enabled to attribute responsi-
bility for the riots by mapping the former crisis onto 
issues with policing and lax criminal justice and the 
latter crisis on gangs and troubled families.  In do-
ing so, politicians performed three core framing tasks 
specified by Snow and Benford95: they diagnosed the 
problem of the riots in terms of two crises, they offered 
the solution of tackling policing, criminal justice, and 
family issues, and they motivated by highlighting the 
costs of the riots. 
Impact of frames on research
How the riots were constructed early on shaped 
subsequent dynamics of knowledge production. These 
dynamics introduced implicit, commonly accepted 
views on who could be considered a legitimate voice 
in the discourse. These views affected the credibility of 
the frames generated in research. Thus, we observed 
a form of discursive path dependency, in which early 
discursive actions limited the range of possible op-
tions moving forward. The elevation of the commu-
nity and the delegitimization of the rioters in political 
discourse influenced research in multiple ways, from 
research design to the substance and framing of find-
ings to how the research was amplified in the media. 
When frames generated in research clashed with 
the dominant narrative of the riots, the news media 
and politicians pursued two strategies of neutraliza-
tion: they harmonized the findings to the prevailing 
account or they attacked the credibility of the re-
search. Overall, the game was tipped in favor of those 
who adhered to the dominant discourse on the riots 
because established frames provided ammunition to 
challenge the credibility of heterodox interpretations. 
Discursive rules and established terms of debate of-
fered resources that actors could exploit to delegiti-
mize others. In this way, the dominant discourse, once 
settled, diminished the possibility of subsequent chal-
lenges. 
However, while early framings significantly in-
fluenced subsequent steps in the interpretive process, 
they did not completely close the door to all other 
forms of action. The Guardian-LSE collaboration was 
able expand the terms of debate through advanta-
geous institutional ties. These ties allowed the authors 
to vigorously defend the project’s methodology and 
findings against attacks grounded in the dominant 
discourse. 
Impact of frames on political action
The acceptance of the social breakdown and 
public order crises as the problems at the heart of the 
riots dictated subsequent political action. Keeler has 
argued that politicians may engineer a sense of crisis 
to advance particular policy goals.96 This paper dem-
onstrates how, given a disruptive shock, politicians 
can capitalize on the ambiguous nature of the event to 
define what kinds of crises the event represents. Their 
ability to do so is enabled and constrained by the news 
media, which may manipulate the depiction of events 
to heighten alarm about particular types of crises. Ul-
timately, in the aftermath of the 2011 English riots, 
the types of crises constructed shaped what problems 
were thought to underlie the disorder. Political influ-
ence over the construction of the crises and the bless-
ing of the conservative news media helped the gov-
ernment establish the events as testimony to a broader 
problem of gangs and a youth mired criminality. This 
allowed the government to advance a policy issue that 
resonated with the Broken Britain thesis. 
Triggering both the fear and urgency mecha-
nisms, the crises channeled political action initially 
into two areas: improving policing of public disorder 
and tackling gangs. In the latter case, when it emerged 
that gangs did not play a large role in the riots, political 
action concerning gangs was enabled to persist with 
a slight frame adjustment that broadened the target 
population to troubled youth and their families. This 
case testifies to the enduring influence of early fram-
ing activities that allowed political action to maintain 
momentum once channeled into politically desired 
policy domains.
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Prompting a parliamentary review of gang and 
youth problems directed additional resources to-
ward deprived communities, as Cloward and Piven 
predict.97 But this paper demonstrates this was not 
a natural, immediate political response, but one that 
occurred as an outcome of the interpretive process. 
Unpacking this process suggests that the state’s action 
should not be categorized as conciliatory. While pro-
viding more support for the most vulnerable members 
of society may be understood as a generally desirable 
outcome, there is little reason to believe that these ac-
tions were necessarily the direct desired outcomes of 
the rioters or community members. Parenting classes, 
for example, may represent a helpful new community 
resource, but it is dubious that rioters were motivated 
to riot because they wanted the government to inter-
vene in their “troubled families.” We cannot ascertain 
the content or even the existence of actual desired po-
litical outcomes given the systematic exclusion of the 
perspectives of the rioters. As such, contrary to what 
Cloward and Piven posit, the government’s response 
should not necessarily be understood as the successful 
achievement of political objectives through an alter-
native means of expressing political grievance. Rather, 
the government’s action might be understood as an 
imposition of political change without any effort to di-
rectly consult those affected in the process. 
Given the government’s recognition that gangs 
played a small role in the riots and evidence suggest-
ing that the government’s “120,000 troubled families” 
do not overlap with the families of rioters,98 it is im-
portant to note that the government’s pursuit of gangs 
and “troubled families” cannot be interpreted as a re-
alistic effort to quell the possibility of future disorder. 
This stands in contrast to the work of Cloward and 
Piven, which argues that the state’s desire to prevent 
future unrest motivates its political responses.99 This 
paper highlights the possibility that state action fol-
lowing disruptive events might have a broader range 
of goals than increasing coercive or social control. As 
the government’s official response to the Riots, Com-
munities and Victims panel exemplified, governments 
may utilize disruptive events to serve as springboards 
to a variety of policy domains. As such, my paper sug-
gests that future empirical studies on the political im-
pact of disruptive events should look for political con-
sequences in a broader range of policy domains than 
public benefits and criminal justice. 
 This paper suggests that power to effect po-
litical change through rioting does not always come 
through the act of rioting itself, but rather through 
access to conversations on how rioting is to be inter-
preted. In the latter account, marginalized groups may 
remain at a disadvantage. Inclusion in media reports 
and research projects may not necessarily be under-
stood as a direct transfer of power. Ultimate control 
over the expressive content of the rioters’ actions may 
remain with external players. Rioters may only be 
allowed a voice insofar as powerful actors and insti-
tutions enable them to have a say. In the case of the 
2011 English riots, it was only through the exercise of 
power by the already powerful that the perspectives of 
rioters were allowed to enter into evidence. 
FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper begins to elucidate how the process 
of generating political meaning shapes the impact 
of large-scale disruptive events. However, additional 
questions remain to be addressed in future research. 
While the process of political meaning making allows 
actors to offer varying interpretations of major events, 
reality is not infinitely malleable. Future research 
should consider how political discourse is constrained 
by other factors like influential actors, institutional 
arrangements, public opinion, and economic, social, 
and political conditions. Future research should also 
include analyses of television, radio, Internet, and so-
cial media content, which may have offered more di-
verse constructions of the riots than did print media.  
Lastly, future research should explore how large 
and what kind of an impact the riots will have in the 
long term. Studies should test competing hypotheses 
on the longevity of reforms introduced in response 
to riots. Prevailing theories posit that reforms will be 
short-lived. Cloward and Piven suggest that expan-
sions of relief occur in short-term spurts that fluctuate 
with waves of unrest.100 Keeler argues that political 
action operating through the urgency and fear mecha-
nisms may not produce enduring change because dor-
mant political opposition may begin to reassert itself 
once a crisis starts to be neutralized, making reforms 
difficult to sustain.101 Similarly, Tarrow has argued 
that initiating reform efforts is not enough to produce 
change; continuous innovation and access to actors 
influencing reform efforts are necessary to usher ini-
tiatives through the political process.102   This paper 
suggests an alternative hypothesis. It suggests that 
when politicians are able to strategically define riots, 
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the reforms observed may consist not of good-faith 
efforts to prevent future unrest but rather of pet proj-
ects that politicians are motivated to uphold. The fo-
cus on gangs in political responses to the 2011 English 
riots persisted, for example, even when politicians ac-
knowledged that gangs played little role in the riots. 
This suggests that reform efforts may not be motivated 
by a desire to quell the possibility of future unrest but 
rather by an interest in advancing favored policy is-
sues that can be rhetorically connected to the events at 
hand. Further work examining the long-term impact 
of disruptive events will be valuable for testing these 
hypotheses.
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